




















































































































































The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility
Tobias Adrian, Christopher R. Burke, and James J. McAndrews
As liquidity conditions in the “repo market”—the market where 
broker-dealers obtain ﬁ  nancing for their securities—deteriorated 
following the near-bankruptcy of Bear Stearns in March 2008, 
the Federal Reserve took the step of creating a special facility to 
provide overnight loans to dealers that have a trading relationship 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Six months later, 
in the wake of new strains in the repo market, the Fed expanded 
the facility by broadening the types of collateral accepted for 
loans. Both initiatives were designed to help restore the orderly 
functioning of the market and to prevent the spillover of distress 
to other ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms.
O
n March 16, 2008, at the height of the Bear Stearns crisis, the Federal Reserve 
Board granted the Federal Reserve Bank of New York the authority to estab-
lish the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). The facility allows primary 
dealers—banks and securities broker-dealers that trade U.S. government and other 
securities with market participants and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York—to 
borrow from the New York Fed on a collateralized basis in times of market stress.1 
By extension, this provision of credit is designed to ease liquidity pressures in the 
broader “repo market,” the secured funding market where primary dealers and others 
normally obtain much of the ﬁ  nancing for their securities holdings. In the days lead-
ing up to the Fed’s action, access to repo ﬁ  nancing had narrowed sharply, and the Fed 
recognized the need to provide dealers with an alternate source of funds. 
This edition of Current Issues offers an overview of the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility. We consider the events that led to the creation of the facility—chieﬂ  y, the 
2008 Bear Stearns turmoil and the liquidity strains that developed in the overnight 
repo market—and the reasons for the expansion of the facility in September 2008.2 
In addition, we discuss the economics of the facility in relation to the Federal 
Reserve’s role as lender of last resort. Also considered are issues relating to the 
supervision of ﬁ  nancial institutions and the risk of moral hazard that have been 
raised following the launch of the PDCF.3 
1 A list of dealers can be found at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html>. 
2 Extensions of transitional credit, announced by the Board of Governors on September 24, 2008, will not 
be covered in this article. See <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080921a.htm>.
3 Moral hazard describes the inducement to engage in riskier behavior when safeguards such as insurance 
are in place. 2
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The Role of Repos and the Repo Market
Primary dealers rely heavily on the repo market—the market for 
repurchase agreements—to ﬁ  nance their portfolios of securities. 
While hedge funds and other investors also fund positions in the 
repo market, the primary dealers stand out as the market’s largest 
group of borrowers. 
In a repo transaction, the holder of a security obtains funds 
by selling that security to another ﬁ  nancial market participant 
under an agreement to repurchase the security at a ﬁ  xed price on 
a predetermined future date. In essence, the seller is borrowing 
funds against the security, typically as a means of ﬁ  nancing the 
original purchase of the security. The buyer—often a pension 
fund, money market mutual fund, or bank—is making a 
collateralized investment, and the trade terms are structured 
to compensate the buyer for use of its funds.
Repos constitute a major source of short-term ﬁ  nancing for 
broker-dealers, representing 38 percent of their liabilities at the 
end of 2007; by contrast, repos represented less than 10 percent 
of commercial banks’ liabilities while deposits claimed a sizable 
59 percent.4 The assets most commonly used in repo ﬁ  nanc-
ings are Treasury securities, private mortgage-backed securities, 
agency securities, and corporate securities, though many other 
types of less liquid collateral have come to be ﬁ  nanced in the 
repo market.
At its height in March 2008, primary dealers’ repo ﬁ  nancing—
including both overnight and longer term loans—reached more 
than $4.5 trillion (Chart 1). In the months that followed, as deal-
ers and others reduced the size of their balance sheets by selling 
assets, the market contracted dramatically, with ﬁ  nancing 
declining 44 percent to less than $2.5 trillion in July 2009.5 
Risk and Liquidity in the Repo Market
To understand how conditions deteriorated in the repo market 
in the weeks leading up to the creation of the PDCF, we need to 
know more about the relationship between repo contracts, risk, 
and liquidity. Most repos are organized as triparty contracts 
4 These percentages are calculated by the authors, using Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release Z.1, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, as of 
fourth-quarter 2007. 
5 The sale of assets is often associated with a decline in leverage: As the total size 
of assets shrinks, equity is constant; thus, leverage—the ratio of total assets to 
equity—declines. For this reason, asset sales are often called “deleveraging.”
in which the borrower posts collateral at a clearing bank and 
receives cash from the lender.6 The clearing bank assesses the 
value of the collateral and applies a “haircut”—the percentage 
difference between the market value of the collateral and the 
amount that a lender can borrow.7 For example, with a haircut of 
3 percent, a dealer can borrow $97 on collateral valued at $100. 
The size of the haircut reﬂ  ects the collateral’s riskiness—for 
example, a corporate security is typically riskier than a Treasury 
bill and will thus have a higher haircut—as well as the credit risk 
of the borrower as assessed by the clearing bank.8 
In the two weeks prior to the creation of the PDCF on 
March 16, 2008, liquidity conditions in the repo market grew very 
strained. Lenders were concerned about both the creditworthi-
ness of borrowers and the riskiness of the collateral pledged—
particularly mortgage-backed securities. With lenders worrying 
that they could lose money on the securities they held as 
collateral, haircuts increased—doubling for some agency mort-
gage securities and increasing signiﬁ  cantly even for borrowers 
with high credit ratings and on relatively safe collateral such as 
Treasury securities.9 
6 Fleming and Garbade (2003) discuss the GCF Repo®, a common form of 
triparty repo contract in the interdealer market. See Adrian and Fleming 
(2005) for an overview of the role of repos and other collateralized borrowing 
agreements for primary dealers.
7 The “margin,” a related concept, is calculated as the haircut multiplied by the 
price of the collateral. 
8 The Primary Dealer Credit Facility operates as a triparty repo contract between 
the primary dealer as borrower, the clearing bank as manager of pricing and 
margins, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as lender. See Boxes 1 and 3.
9 See “Sense of Crisis Haunts Trading Floors,” Financial Times, March 7, 2008; 
“Hedge Funds Squeezed as Lenders Get Tougher,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 
2008; and “Repo Market Funding,” Financial Times, March 11, 2008.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Chart 1
Primary Dealers’ Outstanding Repos
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At its height in March 2008, primary dealers’ repo 
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Such a rapid jump in haircuts will compel dealers to turn to 
other sources—primarily the unsecured funding markets such as 
the Eurodollar market—to obtain funding for their inventories of 
securities. If a dealer cannot borrow in these alternative markets 
and does not have capital available to help fund its inventories, it 
may be forced to sell its securities holdings; if such sales cannot 
be made because markets are illiquid, the dealer—unable to 
repay its creditors—will have little choice but to ﬁ  le for bank-
ruptcy. By most accounts, Bear Stearns faced just such a problem 
on the evening of March 13, 2008, and would have been forced 
to ﬁ  le for bankruptcy on March 14 if the Federal Reserve had not 
extended credit through J.P. Morgan Chase.10 
While this action averted the failure of Bear Stearns, the ﬁ  rm’s 
difﬁ  culties were symptomatic of broader problems in the repo 
market, and it was apparent that further action would be needed 
to limit the disruptions to the market. There was concern that 
higher haircuts would force large numbers of dealers to close out 
their repo transactions and sell off the securities. A rapid sell-off 
would cause the prices of the securities to plummet, prompting 
lenders in the repo market to reassess the risk of holding these 
securities as collateral and to impose even higher haircuts or to 
refuse certain types of collateral altogether. Thus, the sequence 
would repeat itself, with further sell-offs of securities producing 
additional declines in the price of the securities held.11 A similar 
cycle of downward spiraling prices and increasing risk premia 
had occurred before in ﬁ  nancial markets, and particularly in the 
repo market, in the crisis of 1998 and the associated failure of 
the highly leveraged hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management 
10 See Bernanke (2008).
11 The connections between repo haircuts, repo volume, dealer leverage, and 
asset prices have been explored in a number of studies. Adrian and Shin (2008c)
analyze the empirical implications of variations in leverage on equilibrium asset 
prices and risk premia. In other work, these authors provide a microeconomic 
foundation for setting haircuts as a function of risk (Adrian and Shin 2008a) 
and examine the relationship of these issues to monetary policy (Adrian and 
Shin 2008b, 2008d). Kambhu (2006) estimates the economic signiﬁ  cance of repo 
markets—speciﬁ  cally, how a negative shock to repo volume causes spreads to 
diverge from fundamental values. See also the accounts of the 2008-09 crisis 
by Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) and Brunnermeier (2009). Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009), Morris and Shin (2004), and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) 
provide theoretical frameworks.
(LTCM).12 As lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve had a 
strong interest in preventing the recurrence of such events.13
What made the situation even riskier in 2008 than in earlier 
disruptions was the rapid growth in the use of overnight repos 
(Chart 2). The composition of repo debt began to shift toward 
overnight loans during the ﬁ  nancial market boom of 2004-07 and 
continued during the 2007-08 ﬁ  nancial market crisis. Thus, while 
the share of overnight repos in total primary dealer repo funding 
ﬂ  uctuated in a tight range around 50 percent between 1998 and 
2004, it rose to 75 percent in 2008. In dollar terms, overnight 
repos grew from less than $450 billion in July 1994 to a peak 
near $3 trillion in March 2008 (Chart 1), right after the creation 
of the PDCF.
This movement toward shorter term ﬁ  nancing meant that 
a greater portion of the primary dealers’ funding was rolled 
over each day—a risky development in a market subject to the 
“repo run” dynamics described above. With loans coming due so 
quickly, dealers had to scramble to raise the capital necessary to 
pay back their creditors. And lenders had frequent opportunities 
to tighten credit standards and to impose larger haircuts on loans.
A second factor that made conditions in 2008 particularly 
precarious was the resort to less liquid collateral in repo agree-
ments (Chart 3). Originally focused on the highest quality 
12 See Edwards (1999) for an account of the 1998 crisis.
13 Mishkin (2007) observes that “Although the main interests of the Federal 
Reserve are macroeconomic in nature, well-functioning ﬁ  nancial markets are 
ancillary to good economic performance. Conversely, ﬁ  nancial instability can 
compromise economic growth and price stability. Because of this intimate 
connection with economic performance, the Federal Reserve has a clear interest 
in promoting the stability of ﬁ  nancial markets.” 
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Chart 2
Overnight Repos as a Percentage of Total Primary 
Dealer Repo Financing
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in the use of overnight repos. . . . A second factor 
that made conditions . . . precarious was the resort 
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collateral—Treasury and agency debt—repo transactions by 
2008 were making use of below-investment-grade corporate debt 
and equities and even whole loans and trust receipts. This shift 
toward less liquid collateral increased the risks attending a crisis 
in the market since, in the event of a crisis, selling off these secu-
rities would likely take time and occur at a signiﬁ  cant loss.
The Creation of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
To inject liquidity into the market and prevent the spillover of 
distress from Bear Stearns to other ﬁ  nancial institutions, the Fed-
eral Reserve announced the creation of the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility on Sunday, March 16, 2008.14 The facility was designed 
to alleviate the funding pressure on primary dealers in uncertain 
market conditions by providing a backstop facility that made 
overnight loans available against a fairly wide range of collateral 
(see Box 1 for a description of the facility and the terms of the 
loans). More broadly, it was intended to help the repo market to 
continue functioning efﬁ  ciently during an adverse liquidity spiral, 
when credit risk was rising and lending against many types of 
securities had stalled. In practice, the PDCF allows dealers time to 
14 One week earlier, on March 11, 2008, the Federal Reserve implemented 
another facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), through which 
it auctions to primary dealers loans of Treasury securities against riskier 
collateral for twenty-eight days (see Fleming, Hrung, and Keane [2009]). The 
TSLF is available to primary dealers only periodically (generally weekly) for 
term loans while the PDCF is available daily for overnight loans. For a discussion 
of the role of the Federal Reserve’s various lending facilities, see Annex 1 of the 
testimony of Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Timothy F. Geithner 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
April 3, 2008 (<http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/Understanding_Fed
_Lending.html>).
arrange other ﬁ  nancing for their assets—for example, by raising 
equity—or to sell assets at a pace that would not overwhelm the 
markets and drive securities prices down.
In many respects, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility is 
analogous to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, a backstop 
source of liquidity for depository institutions during market 
disruptions (see Box 1). Before the creation of the PDCF, primary 
dealers had no access to a lender-of-last-resort credit facility. Yet 
in modern ﬁ  nancial crises, dealers are the institutions most likely 
to experience liquidity shortages (see Box 2). Primary dealers 
hold long-term assets, such as Treasury securities and mortgage-
backed securities, and fund those assets in short-term markets. 
While maturity transformation has become a central feature of 
the dealers’ funding and investment strategies, such strategies are 
very vulnerable to the risk that short-term funders may decide to 
pull out of the arrangement.
Expansion of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
On September 14, 2008, deepening strains in the repo market 
prompted the Federal Reserve to make an important change in 
the design of the PDCF. Lehman Brothers, a major participant 
in the triparty repo market, was reported to be “only days away” 
from bankruptcy—and there was strong concern that the ﬁ  rm’s 
collapse would put other ﬁ  nancial institutions at risk.15 Citing 
“potential market vulnerabilities in the wake of an unwinding of 
a major ﬁ  nancial institution,” the Federal Reserve acted to expand 
use of the PDCF by broadening the types of collateral acceptable 
for PDCF loans.16 Originally, collateral eligible for pledge under 
the facility included collateral eligible in the Federal Reserve’s 
open market operations, as well as investment-grade corporate 
securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed securities, 
and asset-backed securities.17 Collateral that was not priced by 
the clearing banks was not eligible for pledge under the PDCF. 
With the Fed’s action, all the kinds of collateral then in use in 
15 See Vikas Bajaj, “A Wall Street Goliath Teeters Amid Fears of a Widening 
Crisis,” New York Times, late edition, September 14, 2008. 
16 For the full text of the announcement by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, see <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
monetary/20080914a.htm>.
17 Some mortgage-backed securities are not eligible for pledge in open market 
operations.
Before the creation of the PDCF, primary dealers 
had no access to a lender-of-last-resort credit 
facility. Yet in modern ﬁ  nancial crises, dealers 
are the institutions most likely to experience 
liquidity shortages.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The chart reports repo transactions secured by less liquid collateral as a 
percentage of repo transactions secured by liquid collateral. Less liquid collateral 
includes corporate securities and mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities.
Chart 3
Prevalence of Less Liquid Collateral in Primary Dealers’ 
Repo Transactions
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BOX 2
“Modern” Financial Crises
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ﬁ  nancial sector shocks 
principally manifested themselves as bank runs, in which depositors 
rushed to withdraw their funds from banks perceived to be troubled. 
Modern ﬁ  nancial crises—exempliﬁ  ed by the turmoil in the repo market 
in 2008—take a very different form, one that reﬂ  ects the transformation 
of the ﬁ  nancial system in recent decades. 
What has changed? First, ﬁ  nancial intermediation is increasingly con-
ducted outside of traditional depository institutions. Commercial bank 
assets as a share of total ﬁ  nancial intermediary assets have shrunk, par-
ticularly following the wave of ﬁ  nancial market deregulation in the 1980s. 
In addition, securities brokers and dealers, hedge funds, and mutual 
funds have grown in importance. Assets of securities brokers and dealers 
represented less than 3 percent of U.S. commercial bank assets in 1980; 
by 2007, that share had risen to nearly 30 percent.a Over the same period, 
hedge fund capital has increased from less than 1 percent of commercial 
bank capital to the point where it is estimated to exceed bank capital. 
Second, the change in ﬁ  nancial system “players” has been accom-
panied by a shift toward the use of tradable assets in ﬁ  nancial interme-
diation, on both the asset and the liability side of institutional balance 
sheets. While traditional commercial banks hold nontradable bank loans 
on the asset side of their balance sheets and nontradable deposits on 
the liability side, dealers hold tradable securities on the asset side and 
collateralized short-term ﬁ  nancing instruments such as repos on the 
liability side. 
The increased prominence of tradable assets in the ﬁ  nancial system 
relative to nontradable instruments has created the potential for more 
widespread and sudden illiquidity in the repo and other funding markets. 
Because dealers must mark-to-market the values of these assets and 
liabilities—that is, calculate their value based on current market rates or 
prices—on a daily basis, any changes will immediately affect the dealers’ 
net worth. Thus, when market prices are in sharp decline, dealers will 
book losses and be compelled to close out their positions to pay off their 
debts. As the forced sales of assets drive prices still lower, lenders will 
increasingly seek higher risk premia on the collateral they accept, or refuse 
to lend altogether—actions that can impede or halt the functioning of 
the market. This interaction of asset price declines and funding liquidity 
constraints essentially deﬁ  nes the modern “run.” It has been at the heart 
of two major ﬁ  nancial breakdowns in recent years—the failure of Long-
Term Capital Management in 1998 and the current ﬁ  nancial crisis.
a Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
BOX 1
Operation of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
a The primary dealer system was established by the New York Fed in 1960 with 
eighteen dealers. In 1988, the number of dealers peaked at forty-six; between 
the mid-1990s and 2007, it dropped to eighteen. The key reason for the decline 
has been industry consolidation, as government securities trading ﬁ  rms merge 
or refocus their core businesses. See <http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/
primarydealers.html>. 
b Only 123 loans were made under the provisions of Section 13(3) from 1932 
to 1936, and thereafter no such borrowing took place until the creation of 
the PDCF (see Todd [1993, p. 18]).
The PDCF program is based on the triparty repo legal and operational 
infrastructure that the Federal Reserve uses to conduct its repo opera-
tions. (See Box 3 for a discussion of triparty repo agreements.) To access 
the PDCF, primary dealersa communicate a demand for overnight fund-
ing to their clearing banks, typically by 5 p.m. ET on business days. The 
clearing bank veriﬁ  es that a sufﬁ  cient amount of eligible collateral has 
been pledged to the loan by the primary dealer and notiﬁ  es the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York accordingly. Once the New York Fed receives 
notice that a sufﬁ  cient amount of margin-adjusted eligible collateral has 
been assigned to its account, it transfers the amount of the loan to the 
clearing bank for credit to the primary dealer.
The pledged collateral is valued by the clearing banks using vendor 
pricing services. Loans are limited to the amount of margin-adjusted 
eligible collateral pledged by the dealer and assigned to the New York 
Fed’s account at the clearing bank. While loans under the PDCF are col-
lateralized, they are loans made under recourse; thus, the primary dealer 
is responsible for repayment even if the collateral loses value overnight.
PDCF loans made to primary dealers increase the total supply of 
reserves in the banking system, in the same way that discount window 
loans do. When the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Trading Desk was 
targeting a non-zero federal funds rate, the reserve impact of PDCF loans 
was offset using a number of tools, including, but not necessarily limited 
to, reverse repurchase agreements, outright sales or redemptions of Trea-
sury securities, a reduction in the size of conventional repo transactions, 
and use of the authority to pay interest on reserves.  However, when the 
FOMC reduced the target fed funds rate to a range from zero to 25 basis 
points, there was no longer any need to offset or “sterilize” these loans.
As it does for loans made to depository institutions through the 
discount window, the Federal Reserve makes information on PDCF 
borrowing available each Thursday, generally at 4:30 p.m. ET, through its 
Statistical Release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Deposi-
tory Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks.” The 
H.4.1 release reports the total amount of PDCF credit outstanding at the 
close of business on the previous business day as well as the average daily 
amount of credit outstanding for each week.
The legal authority to establish the PDCF is based on Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Section 13(3), passed in 1932, allows the 
Federal Reserve to provide credit to individuals, partnerships, or corpora-
tions on an emergency basis. The central bank applied it to primary 
dealers for the purpose of establishing the PDCF.b6
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triparty repo—including non-investment-grade securities and 
equities—became eligible for pledge in the PDCF. 
Although the potential failure of a major repo market partici-
pant was the immediate impetus for the Fed’s decision to expand 
the collateral eligible for pledge in the PDCF, the Fed was also 
responding to more general concerns about the structure of the 
triparty repo system—speciﬁ  cally, the exposure incurred by the 
clearing banks to a possible default by borrowers in the market. 
In “term,” or multiple-day, triparty repo transactions, the clearing 
bank “unwinds” the transaction each morning, returning the 
funds borrowed to the lender’s account and the collateral (that is, 
the securities lent) to the borrower’s account. While this practice 
is intended to give borrowers the ﬂ  exibility to substitute different 
collateral,18 it means that the clearing bank must extend credit to
18 For example, borrowers might wish to substitute different collateral if an 
opportunity arises to sell the pledged securities at a favorable price.
the borrower until the parties reinstate their commitments at the 
end of the day.
In September 2008, the risk that Lehman Brothers’ clearing 
bank took each morning in unwinding the ﬁ  rm’s triparty repo 
transactions (and thus extending credit to Lehman) was growing. 
(See Box 3 for a description of the mechanics of triparty repo.) 
At the time, outstanding triparty repos totaled $2.5 trillion; if 
either of the clearing banks had chosen not to unwind the ﬁ  rm’s 
repo transactions in the morning, the ﬁ  rm’s counterparties—
including pension funds and money market mutual funds with 
thousands of individual cash investors—would be left  holding 
collateral that they would be forced to sell quickly. Such an 
outcome would further depress asset prices and potentially cause 
additional disruption to the ﬁ  nancial system.
By expanding the collateral acceptable to the PDCF program 
to all triparty collateral, the Fed provided a means for the dealers 
BOX 3
Triparty Repo Mechanics
As the name implies, a triparty repo transaction involves three parties: 
a cash lender (the investor), a borrower that will provide collateral 
against the loan, and a triparty clearing bank. The triparty clearing bank 
provides cash and collateral custody accounts for parties to the repo deal 
and collateral management services. These services include ensuring that 
pledged collateral meets the cash lenders’ requirements, pricing collateral, 
ensuring collateral sufﬁ  ciency, and moving cash and collateral between 
the parties’ accounts.
Both the investor and the borrower must have accounts at the clear-
ing bank, and all three parties are bound by legal documentation called 
the triparty repo agreement. In the United States, there are two triparty 
clearing banks: the Bank of New York and J.P.  Morgan Chase. One of the 
operational beneﬁ  ts of triparty repos is that, regardless of the term of the 
loan, the clearing bank unwinds the transaction each morning, returning 
the cash to the investor’s account and the collateral to the borrower’s 
account. Then at the end of the day, the borrower pledges qualifying 
collateral back to the deal, which once priced, determined as eligible, and 
deemed sufﬁ  cient to meet the terms of the deal by the clearing bank, is 
moved to the investor’s account while the cash is placed in the borrower’s 
account. In this way, no speciﬁ  c collateral is committed for more than 
overnight. This arrangement allows borrowers to pledge whatever eligible 
collateral they have on hand each day, thus enabling them to manage their 
securities portfolios more effectively.
An important implication of this daily unwinding, however, is that 
the counterparty risk for the investor shifts from its repo counterparty 
to the triparty clearing bank, and the clearing bank becomes exposed to 
the borrower. Overnight, the cash investor has the borrower’s collateral in 
its account and the borrower has the cash. If the borrower defaults over-
night—say, by ﬁ  ling for bankruptcy—the lender has the collateral in its 
account and thus is covered and the clearing bank is not affected.a Once 
the collateral and cash are returned in the morning, however, the clearing 
bank, which has extended credit to the borrower to ﬁ  nance the original 
collateral purchase, becomes exposed to the borrower. Consequently, 
the clearing bank needs to determine each morning if it is comfortable 
accepting the exposure to the borrower that the reversal of the transac-
tion will create.
a As a likely counterparty to the defaulting borrower in other transactions, 
the triparty clearing bank will in all probability be directly affected by the 
borrower’s ﬁ  ling for bankruptcy.
Citing “potential market vulnerabilities in the wake 
of an unwinding of a major ﬁ  nancial institution,” 
the Federal Reserve acted to expand use of the 
PDCF by broadening the types of collateral 
acceptable for PDCF loans.
Although the potential failure of a major repo 
market participant was the immediate impetus for 
the Fed’s decision to expand the collateral eligible 
for pledge in the PDCF, the Fed was also responding 
to more general concerns about the structure of the 
triparty repo system.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   7
 
to obtain funds against any collateral they had in triparty repo 
transactions. So dealers that were unable to ﬁ  nd ﬁ  nancing for 
their collateral in private markets could turn to the Fed. Moreover, 
the Fed’s readiness to lend would in turn reassure the clearing 
bank that the dealer would be able to fulﬁ  ll the terms of the repo 
agreement. Thus, the clearing bank would be more likely to 
proceed with the reversal of the transaction.
Use of the Facility
How have the primary dealers responded to the creation of the 
PDCF? Primary dealers have borrowed actively through the PDCF 
at various points in time. Initially, much of the borrowing was by 
Bear Stearns.19 Funds lent through the facility ﬁ  rst peaked at close 
to $40 billion in April 2008, then declined steadily over the follow-
ing months as strains on dealers’ balance sheets abated, conditions 
in the ﬁ  nancing markets improved, and the backstop pricing of 
the PDCF became less attractive (Chart 4). Use of the facility fell 
signiﬁ  cantly after the conclusion of the ﬁ  nancing arrangements 
associated with J.P. Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns 
in late June20 and stopped altogether in mid-July 2008. 
Both PDCF and discount window usage exploded following 
the Fed’s move to expand PDCF-eligible collateral on  Septem-
ber 14 and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings on 
19 See “Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of 
Federal Financial Regulators,” U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, April 3, 2008 (<http://banking.senate.gov/public/index 
.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=ec013d8f-fe1e-4fb6-a514
-ab93be32ad38>).
20 See the Federal Reserve Bank of New York press release of June 26, 2008, for a 
description of the transaction (<http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/
markets/2008/ma080626.html>).
September 15 (Chart 4). In the wake of Lehman Brothers’ failure, 
other primary dealers experienced severe difﬁ  culties obtaining 
funding in the capital markets as lenders imposed higher hair-
cuts on repos and became more selective in the type of securities 
they would accept as collateral. In that environment, borrow-
ing through the PDCF soared to $59.7 billion on Wednesday, 
September 17, from no activity during the previous week. In this 
instance, the PDCF fulﬁ  lled one of the purposes for which it was 
intended: to be available in the event that a failure of a primary 
dealer led to severe funding disruptions for the surviving dealers. 
PDCF borrowing reached more than $140 billion in October 2008, 
while discount window borrowing rose above $100 billion.
Thereafter, conditions in the funding markets improved, 
and dealers could once again ﬁ  nd less expensive ﬁ  nancing in 
the market than with the Fed. As a consequence, PDCF usage 
declined, reaching zero in mid-May 2009.
As for the effectiveness of the PDCF in improving the func-
tioning of the repo and other funding markets, one important 
indicator is the change in the credit default swap spreads of the 
ﬁ  rms that had access to the facility (Chart 5). Credit default swap 
spreads are a measure of the credit risk inherent in lending to 
ﬁ  rms; signiﬁ  cantly, these spreads fell for primary dealers for 
roughly three months following the creation of the PDCF.
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances
of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks.”
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Creation of the 
Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility
Both PDCF and discount window usage exploded 
following the Fed’s move to expand PDCF-eligible 
collateral on  September 14 and the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers Holdings on September 15.8
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Funding and Pricing Issues
Several features of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility are designed 
to ensure that it serves as a backstop, rather than a principal, 
source of funding for primary dealers and that its terms do not 
confer a subsidy on users. First, the Fed extends credit through 
the facility at the discount rate, which it sets in excess of the target 
federal funds rate (currently 25 basis points above the top end of 
the policy target range). Under normal conditions, the discount 
rate exceeds the overnight repo rate for most eligible securities, 
with the result that the PDCF would not be an especially attractive 
means of ﬁ  nancing an inventory of securities. Second, the Fed 
provides guidance on the use of the PDCF, counseling primary 
dealers to seek ﬁ  nancing ﬁ  rst in the private markets and to turn 
to the PDCF only as a fallback. Third, the facility is subject to an 
escalating usage fee. The fee is imposed on borrowers that draw 
on the facility on more than forty-ﬁ  ve business days; it rises after 
each additional forty-ﬁ  ve days of use. Given these features, the 
PDCF is unlikely to displace private investors to become a major 
source of funding for the primary dealers.
In addition, the Fed has given the PDCF other features that 
protect the central bank against losses in the event of a primary 
dealer default. Most notably, PDCF loans are overcollateralized—
that is, the Fed applies a haircut, albeit one that is lower than 
those applied by private lenders in crisis times. In calculating 
haircuts on PDCF-eligible collateral, the Federal Reserve faces 
a trade-off: on the one hand, lower haircuts leave the Fed more 
vulnerable to credit risk; on the other hand, they help to restore 
liquidity to the repo market by enabling dealers to borrow more 
for a particular amount of collateral. For a given PDCF interest 
rate, a haircut lower than those imposed by private lenders could 
provide dealers with arbitrage opportunities, but it will also help 
dealers to roll over their loans and maintain their portfolios. The 
Fed periodically reviews all its haircut practices to ensure that 
they reﬂ  ect current risk and pricing developments. 
Moral Hazard Issues
Concerns have been raised that the PDCF, by offering primary 
dealers a liquidity backstop, encourages risky behavior. In this 
view, the facility effectively invites primary dealers to delay 
raising equity because they can instead borrow from the Federal 
Reserve. These “moral hazard” issues are similar to those that 
arise in the context of emergency lending to banks. 
The countervailing view, however, is that the PDCF functions 
to protect prudently managed institutions from the damaging 
consequences of the risks taken by highly leveraged ﬁ  rms. In 
the period following the Bear Stearns crisis and again after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the liquidity provided by the PDCF 
helped reduce the spillover of distress to more conservatively 
managed ﬁ  rms by enabling these ﬁ  rms to maintain their securi-
ties inventories and to fulﬁ  ll their obligations to creditors and 
clients.21 
Regulatory Issues
To the extent that backstop lending facilities like the PDCF might 
create conditions conducive to moral hazard, it is important to 
have regulation in place that helps enforce the prudent manage-
ment of funding positions. Currently, the supervision of primary 
dealers is shared by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the Federal Reserve.22 All securities broker-dealers are 
regulated by the SEC, while a subset of this group—those dealers 
that are part of commercial bank holding companies—are also 
supervised by the Federal Reserve. The latter group includes 
dealers that have merged with, or been acquired by, bank holding 
companies as well as dealers that have transformed themselves 
into bank holding companies.23 
Since March 2008, four primary dealers that, as standalone in-
vestment banks, had been supervised exclusively by the SEC have 
21  See the remarks of Jeremy Stein, delivered at the Second Princeton–New York 
Fed Liquidity Conference, December 13, 2007 (<http://newyorkfed.org/research/
conference/2007/liquidity/Stein_Panel.pdf>).
22  After the introduction of the PDCF, the Fed worked in conjunction with 
the SEC to monitor closely the funding strategies and resources of the 
primary dealers. On July 7, 2008, the two agencies announced the signing 
of a memorandum of understanding that “formalizes . . . recent cooperation 
on matters including banking and investment banking capital and liquidity 
following the Board’s emergency opening of credit facilities to primary dealers.”
23  After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed in 1999, some commercial 
bank holding companies, including Citigroup and Bank of America, acquired 
dealers. (Even before the passage of the act, however, some bank holding 
companies owned relatively small broker-dealer ﬁ  rms.) In 2002, primary dealer 
J.P. Morgan merged with Chase Manhattan Bank. 
Several features of the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility are designed to ensure that it serves as a 
backstop, rather than a principal, source of funding 
for primary dealers and that its terms do not 
confer a subsidy on users.
The countervailing view [to concerns about 
moral hazard] is that the PDCF functions to 
protect prudently managed institutions from the 
damaging consequences of the risks taken by 
highly leveraged ﬁ  rms.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   9
The PDCF has the potential to beneﬁ  t trading in the repo 
market beyond the direct injection of funding. The very 
existence of the facility is a source of reassurance to primary 
dealers and their customers. Moreover, the PDCF can 
strengthen investors’ conﬁ  dence that broker-dealers will 
return funds borrowed under a repo promptly at maturity, 
because the dealers can borrow from the Federal Reserve 
when they—or their clients—are unable to fund their securi-
ties holdings in other ways. 
To be sure, concerns have been raised that access to this 
type of backstop funding source could discourage dealers 
from managing their funding positions carefully. Yet the risk of 
such perverse incentives is offset by the protections the PDCF 
affords more prudent ﬁ  rms against the market stresses created 
by their highly leveraged counterparts.
Finally, the possibility of moral hazard raises the question 
whether broker-dealers should be required to be subsidiaries 
of bank holding companies—a change that would bring them 
under the Fed’s regulatory authority. A PDCF in which the 
Federal Reserve lent only to ﬁ  rms that it supervised would 
almost certainly be less vulnerable to moral hazard.
The authors are grateful to Markus Brunnermeier, Hyun Song Shin, 
and John Taylor for valuable comments.
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